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Abstract
In the framework of propositional  Lukasiewicz logic, a suitable notion of implicit de-
finability, tailored to the intended real-valued semantics and referring to the elements of
its domain, is introduced. Several variants of implicitly defining each of the rational ele-
ments in the standard semantics are explored, and based on that, a faithful interpretation
of theories in Rational Pavelka logic in theories in  Lukasiewicz logic is obtained. Some
of these results were already presented in [12] as technical statements. A connection to
the lack of (deductive) Beth property in  Lukasiewicz logic is drawn. Moreover, while irra-
tional elements of the standard semantics are not implicitly definable by finitary means, a
parallel development is possible for them in the infinitary  Lukasiewicz logic. As an appli-
cation of definability of the rationals, it is shown how computational complexity results
for Rational Pavelka logic can be obtained from analogous results for  Lukasiewicz logic.
The complexity of the definability notion itself is studied as well. Finally, we review the
import of these results for the precision/vagueness discussion for fuzzy logic, and for the
general standing of truth constants in  Lukasiewicz logic.
1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the study of truth constants in  Lukasiewicz logic. Previous
works on the subject, often in a wider context of other t-norm based logics, include [22, 12,
14, 8, 5]. Predominantly, this paper is about constants for rational elements of [0, 1], but an
analogous development for irrational constants in the infinitary variant of  Lukasiewicz logic
is suggested. Since truth constants are native to propositional logic, the entire paper stays
on the propositional level.
Two logics are juxtaposed in this paper: (infinite-valued)  Lukasiewicz logic  L and Rational
Pavelka logic RPL. The former was introduced by Jan  Lukasiewicz, with later simplifications
by himself and others (see [17]). The latter, RPL, was introduced by Ha´jek in [12] as a
considerable simplification of earlier systems for reasoning with partially true statements as
envisaged by Goguen [11] and proposed by Pavelka [22]. Many resources discuss one or both
of these logics very accurately, but two excellent sources are [12] and [14].
In Section 3, we start with providing a semantic notion of implicit definability, referring
to the standard MV-algebra [0, 1] L. This is in accord with the ontology of truth constants
(rational or other) in  Lukasiewicz logic, which arise from the real-valued semantics (intended,
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and presumably therefore called “standard”) and permeate the syntax. Using the fact that
that each rational is definable in [0, 1] L under this semantic definability notion, we faithfully
interpret RPL in a particular theory over  L; this interpretation result was first presented in
[12], where a different evidence for implicit definability is provided. Moreover, [14, Theorem
2.6] offers what is presumably the next best thing to rational constants being term definable:
for each formula ϕ of RPL and positive integer n divisible by denominators of truth constants
in ϕ, there is an  L-formula ψ s.t. RPL ⊢ ϕn ≡ ψ. Along the way, we also discuss other
methods of obtaining implicit definability of rationals; e.g., one can rely on the bookkeeping
formulas, which do the job very adequately, or one can refer to formulas representing certain
McNaughton functions.
Mimicking the finitary definition in (finitary)  Lukasiewicz logic, a non-finitary definability
notion for irrationals in infinitary  Lukasiewicz logic  L∞ is outlined, with some analogous
properties (e.g., under a theory containing the defining formulas, valid bookkeeping statements
for the irrationals can be derived in the logic).
Implicit definability is evocative of Beth property. We briefly consider this (somewhat
broader) context, and discuss how our technique provides another way of demonstrating the
lack of (deductive) Beth property in  Lukasiewicz logic, proved in [16]. The status of RPL
with respect to Beth property seems to be unknown.
We then weigh the message of this interpretability result, and exploit it somewhat. It
seems to be often overlooked that a considerable part of the metamathematics of  Lukasiewicz
logic with constants is already addressed by (a special case of) the metamathematics of
theories over  Lukasiewicz logic. As an example of this phenomenon and an application of
the interpretation result, in Section 4 we inspect the result on complexity of propositional
RPL, that is, the recognition of theoremhood and finite consequence relation. Both are coNP-
complete; we show that this result is implied by (the same) complexity results for  L. We also
show that the notion of definability as such, taken as a decision problem, is hard.
Finally, apparently the defining formulas allow for speaking about arbitrary rational truth
values, which brings to mind previous discussions of the artificial precision problem in fuzzy
logic. We briefly touch this topic in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
This paper deals with propositional  Lukasiewicz logic and its algebraic semantics. It makes
no distinction between propositional formulas (in the language of  Lukasiewicz or other logics,
possibly expanding the language) and terms of the language of the algebraic semantics; thus
formulas and terms are the same objects. Similarly, we conflate propositional connectives
with function symbols.
Although  Lukasiewicz logic can be presented in several very succinct sets of basic con-
nectives, we make use of a variety of connectives: the language of FLew, namely, the set
{·,→,∧,∨, 0, 1}, the negation ¬, the strong disjunction ⊕, and the equivalence ≡. The ex-
pression xn stands for x · x · . . . x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
and nx stands for x⊕ x⊕ . . . x︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
.
 Lukasiewicz logic is amply presented and discussed in literature (see [4, 7, 21]); this paper
takes for granted the reader’s familiarity with the basics. A general semantics of  Lukasiewicz
logic is given by the variety of MV-algebras. The standard MV-algebra [0, 1] L is given by the
 Lukasiewicz t-norm on the domain of the real unit interval [0, 1]. While  L is strongly complete
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w.r.t. MV-algebras, it only enjoys finite strong standard completeness, but not strong standard
completeness (see [12, 6]). The finite MV-chain with n+ 1 elements is denoted Ln+1.
Rational Pavelka logic RPL (see [12]) expands the language of  Lukasiewicz logic with
constants for rationals in [0, 1]. Extending the notational convention for the two constants 0
and 1, we use horizontal bars to distinguish the constant r from its intended interpretation
r (this convention extends also to irrationals used here).1 The intended interpretation, i.e.,
r being interpreted by r for each r ∈ Q, is referred to as the canonical interpretation of
constants, to distinguish it from other interpretations, given by algebras that contain an
isomorphic copy of (a subalgebra of) the standard MV-algebra on the rationals.
A bookkeeping formula (see [12]) is a formula recording the behaviour of an algebraic
operation on elements of the domain interpreting the constants, predominantly, the rationals
in [0, 1]; this domain is closed under the operations of [0, 1] L. For example, 6/13 → 5/13 ≡
12/13 is a bookkeeping formula. It is quite usual to include all such bookkeeping formulas
that are valid under the canonical interpretation in [0, 1] L as axioms of a logic featuring
constants; the bookkeeping axioms are then the only new axioms that are added. This is
indeed the case of RPL as an axiomatic expansion of  L.
We do not consider a general semantics for RPL, only the standard one, whose  L-reduct
is the algebra [0, 1] L. By slight abuse of language, we use the notation [0, 1] L also for the
RPL-algebra that expands the standard MV-algebra with a canonical interpretation of each
rational constant, or even for an algebra that further expands the language with constants
whose intended interpretation is irrational (Subsection 3.4).
RPL enjoys finite strong standard canonical completeness (see [8]): that is, for a finite
T, ϕ in the language of RPL, we have T ⊢RPL ϕ if and only if T entails ϕ in [0, 1] L under the
canonical interpretation of constants.2
Finite strong canonical completeness of RPL (and finite strong completeness of  L) entails
a conservativity result for RPL over  L for propositional case; the conservativity proof for the
two first-order logics is more laborious (see [14]). Although the proof is based on finite strong
standard completeness, we do have that if T is infinite and T, ϕ are without constants, then
T ⊢RPL ϕ if and only if T ⊢ L ϕ.
3 Definability
A truth constant is specified within the language of a propositional calculus: it is a nullary
connective, its behaviour determined by the axioms and rules of the calculus. Providing a
semantics for the calculus involves suggesting an interpretation of its terms, including the
constants.
Nevertheless, in addition to constants specified by the language, some other terms in the
language may behave as constants too. As a ready example, many terms of either classical or
fuzzy propositional logic behave as the constants 0 and 1: we refer to them as contradictions
and tautologies respectively. Here “behave as” can have either of two meanings: the constant
0 is in the language anyway and the term in question is provably equivalent to it, or it is not
in the language and one relies on the a semantics where the term in question always evaluates
1We also use a horizontal bar to denote complement of a set. A vector of variables is denoted with a tilde
(such as x˜).
2In fact, the canonical interpretation of constants is the only one that consistently expands [0, 1] L under
the usual bookkeeping axioms; see Section 3.
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to the intended evaluation of the (possibly absent) constant.3 In either case, one would speak
about term definability. We return to this kind of definability in Section 3.3. Recalling that
the set of contradictory terms and the set of tautologous terms of classical propositional are
both coNP complete, the simple example above also hints that it is nontrivial to determine
if a given term behaves as a particular constant.
Definition 3.1. Let a ∈ [0, 1]. The value a is term-definable in [0, 1] L if and only if there is
an MV-term ϕ such that v(ϕ) = a for each valuation v in [0, 1] L.
In the standard MV-algebra [0, 1] L, no constants beyond the classical ones are term-
definable: constant non-integer functions are not McNaughton functions ([19]). So the deci-
sion problem “Does ϕ term-define x?” is limited to x ∈ {0, 1}; we are asking about unsatis-
fiable or tautologous terms in the real-valued semantics of propositional  Lukasiewicz logic.
3.1 Defining the rationals
This section aims to expose a phenomenon that is one step more nuanced. Namely, some
variables may behave as constants in the framework of a particular theory: in each model
of the theory, the value of such variables is fixed. We will discuss (propositional) implicit
definability. In fact we shall present two different concepts: implicit definability by a term
(i.e., a finite theory) and a variant thereof where the defining theory is necessarily infinite and
the logic considered is not finitary. The focus of this paper is on the former concept, which
employs the more frequently considered finitary  Lukasiewicz logic  L.
Definition 3.2. Let A be an MV-algebra, a an element of its domain, ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) an MV-
term, and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The term ϕ implicitly defines the element a in variable xi in A if and
only if
• ϕ is satisfiable in A, and
• v(ϕ) = 1A implies v(xi) = a for each A-valuation v.
An element a ∈ A is definable in A if and only if there is an MV-term that defines it there.
It is not difficult to come up with a suitable theory that implicitly defines rationals in
[0, 1] L. Indeed a theory T in variables indexed by the rationals (say, xm/n for m,n coprime),
and with just the usual bookkeeping formulas for these variables, obtained from the corre-
sponding MV-operations on the indices of the variables (e.g., x6/13 → x5/13 ≡ x12/13), as the
axioms of T , makes all the variables xm/n behave just as the constant m/n would behave in
RPL. T is infinite, so it does not follow the requirement of implicit definability (of each of
the rationals) by a term; however, one quickly observes that to implicitly define m/n, only
constants with denominators n are needed. This allows for a much narrower theory T that is
finite and has a unique interpretation (namely, the canonical one) in [0, 1] L. We shall return
to this claim at the end of Subsection 3.2 by providing a sketchy example, and we also discuss
a redundancy issue there.
3The discourse in mathematical fuzzy logic so far confirms that fuzzy logics are semantics-based; accordingly,
constants are tied to the intended (real-valued) semantics, standing for the rational or the real numbers thereof.
Indeed, where all rational constants from the interval [0, 1] are present, one may claim that semantics has
leaked into syntax in a substantial way, in particular, such a process narrows down the range of algebraic
interpretations of the calculus noticeably.
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Another way to implicitly define a rational a is to rely on McNaughton functions: there
is a plethora of one-variable McNaughton functions that attain the value 1 on the singleton
{a}, each of them corresponds to an MV-term, and each such term implicitly defines a.
One construction using yet different term to achieve implicit definability was already given
in [12]. The book also presents a faithful interpretation of theories in RPL in theories in  L,
which we reproduce below. We use the various versions of proving implicit definability for a
general point to be made in a subsequent section.
We offer a simple variant of the definability axioms. They are only marginally different
from bookkeeping, one of the differences being that 1/n is defined by a single term without
additional variables.
3.2 A theory of constants
From now on, definability and implicit definability may be conflated to the latter, for the sake
of brevity.
The following technical lemma is a useful tool for MV-algebras (cf. [23, 10, 15]).
Lemma 3.3. Let A be an MV-chain and n ≥ 2 an integer. The equation x = (¬x)n−1 has a
solution in A if and only if A has a subalgebra isomorphic to  Ln+1. If the solution exists, it
is unique: the smallest nonzero element of  Ln+1.
Corollary 3.4. Let n ≥ 2. The formula x ≡ (¬x)n−1 defines 1/n in [0, 1] L.
Corollary 3.5. Any rational number in the unit interval is definable in [0, 1] L.
Proof. In [0, 1] L, the formulas x ≡ 0 and x ≡ 1 define rationals 0 and 1. Moreover 1/n is
definable for n ≥ 2 by a formula in one variable. The two-variable formula ϕ(x, y), defined as
(y ≡ (¬y)n−1) · (x ≡ my), defines m/n in the variable x.
We now establish that, under suitable axioms, variables can play the role of rational truth
constants. Let Q = {qm,n | m,n ∈ N,m ≤ n, n > 0} be a set of variables. We write qm/n
instead of qm,n. Define a theory TQ in  Lukasiewicz logic  L, using (only) the variables Q. The
theory TQ consists of:
• axiom q0/n ≡ 0 for each n > 0;
• axiom q1/1 ≡ 1;
• axiom q1/n ≡ (¬q1/n)
n−1 for each n ≥ 2;
• axiom qm/n ≡ mq1/n for each m ≤ n, n ≥ 2.
It follows from Corollary 3.5 that TQ has exactly one model over [0, 1] L, namely, the one
where each qm/n is interpreted by m/n.
Under the axiom defining 1/n, in the language containing the corresponding q-variable,
the value m/n becomes term definable as mq1/n; we might use this term directly, instead of
introducing a new variable. It is only introduced for uniformity of presentation.
Lemma 3.6. (Over  Lukasiewicz logic,) TQ proves the following:
• each valid bookkeeping formula in the sense of q-variables; e.g.,
qm/n · qk/l ≡ q(m/n)·(k/l), and analogously for any other bookkeeping formula usually
considered;
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• qm/n ≡ qm′/n′ for m/n = m
′/n′;
• qm/n ≡ 1 for m = n.
Proof. We show the first statement; the rest is analogous. Consider a slightly stronger state-
ment: let ϕ be a particular bookkeeping statement and let T0 ⊆ TQ consist of definitions of
only those rationals that are used in ϕ and any auxiliary rationals needed to define them;
then T0 is finite. We have T0 |=[0,1] L qm/n · qk/l ≡ q(m/n)·(k/l) by definition of the q-variables.
The provability claim follows from finite strong standard completeness of  L.
On an analogous note (and with an analogous proof), one might substitute any other
family of terms that have been proved to enable implicit definability of the rationals (with a
suitable indexing of variables): they will be provable from our axioms (and vice versa, each
of the our axioms will be provable from them) as a consequence of finite strong standard
completeness.
The axioms just presented are redundant. It is in fact sufficient to define 1/n for each
prime n. Then not only m/n becomes term definable for each m ≤ n, but also, for n, n′ two
primes, 1/(knn′) is term definable for each k, because the subalgebra generated by 1/n and
1/n′ in [0, 1] L contains the value 1/(knn
′) and the algebra Lknn′ generated by it; this entails
that all of the elements are term definable (see [7] and [23]).
We define a translation ⋆ of formulas of RPL into formulas of  L; note that we assume
RPL uses a countably infinite set X of variables (we refer to them as x-variables). For each
variable xi of RPL, x
⋆
i is xi, for each constant (other than 0 and 1), (m/n)
⋆ is qm/n. Extend
⋆ to formulas as commuting with all connectives. If T is a set of RPL-formulas, then T ⋆ is
the set of ⋆-translations thereof. observe that ⋆ is a bijection between rational constants of
RPL (different from 0 and 1) and q-variables of  L.
Corollary 3.7. 4 Let T be a theory and ϕ a formula in the language of RPL. We have
T ⊢RPL ϕ if and only if T
⋆ ∪ TQ ⊢ L ϕ
⋆.
Proof. ⋆-translations of bookkeeping axioms are provable in TQ. On the other hand, the
TQ-axioms become theorems of RPL under de-starring.
As a special case (T empty), the theory TQ proves (translations of) all theorems or RPL.
Coming back to bookkeeping formulas, let us see how they might provide an alternative
implicit definition of the rationals. We limit the presentation to a sketchy example, leaving
the rest to the interested reader. Working in a language with ·, → and 0 as basic connectives,
we shall show how to define rationals with a denominator 3. The following are some (not all)
bookkeeping formulas for variables indexed by such rationals:
x2/3 · x2/3 ≡ x1/3
x1/3 · x2/3 ≡ x0
x1/3 · x1/3 ≡ x0
x1/3 → x0 ≡ x2/3
Under the additional information that x0 ≡ 0, the last axiom reads ¬x1/3 ≡ x2/3, which,
combined with the first one, gives (¬x1/3)
2 ≡ x1/3; the latter implies v(x1/3) = 1/3 in [0, 1] L for
4Cf. [12], Lemma 3.3.13(2)
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all models v of the four bookkeeping formulas above, appealing to Corollary 3.4. Observations
to be made are (a) the four formulas entail (semantically, and hence also syntactically) an
instance of x ≡ (¬x)n−1 for n = 3, and hence define 1/3 in the variable x1/3; (b) the second
and third axiom are redundant; they follow (semantically, and hence syntactically) from the
first and the fourth axiom. Analogously, one might find redundancies in bookkeeping for
other denominators, and hence also for combining different prime denominators, for example.
We do not go into detail.
Thus, bookkeeping formulas are sufficient (and more than that) for implicit definition of
all the rationals in [0, 1] L.
3.3 Deductive Beth property
To formulate Beth property, we recall the definition of the two properties (of explicit and
implicit definability) as usually considered, i.e., referring to variables rather than elements of
a specific semantics. Within the scope of this subsection we shall use the notions as given in
Definition 3.8.
There are at least two ways to render the property in  Lukasiewicz logic (see the discussion
in [20]); what is studied here is the deductive version of Beth property.
Definition 3.8. Let L be a logic and ϕ(x, z˜) a term in the language of L.
• ϕ explicitly defines x in L if and only if there is a term δ(z˜) (in the z˜-variables only)
such that ϕ(x, z˜) ⊢L x ≡ δ(z˜) for each x and z˜
• ϕ implicitly defines x in L if and only if ϕ(x, z˜), ϕ(x′, z˜) ⊢L x ≡ x
′ for each x, x′, and z˜
Our earlier (semantic) definitions of term- and implicit definability in [0, 1] L nod to the
definitions (for variables) above. In particular, any equation, or finite system thereof, that has
a unique solution in a variable x in [0, 1] L, translates in the obvious way into a propositional
equivalence (a term) that implicitly defines x in the logic  L. This is a consequence of the
finite strong standard completeness theorem of  L.
Lemma 3.9. The term x ≡ (¬x)n−1 implicitly defines x in  L.
We say that a logic has the deductive Beth property if, whenever a term ϕ implicitly
defines x, then the term also explicitly defines x.
Corollary 3.10.  Lukasiewicz propositional logic does not have the deductive Beth property.
Proof. We have that x ≡ (¬x)n−1 implicitly defines x. In order for this formula to explicitly
define x, an MV-term needs to exist that is provably equivalent to x under x ≡ (¬x)n−1; so
in particular, in [0, 1] L, the term would have to take the constant value 1/n. There is no such
MV-term; therefore, x ≡ (¬x)n−1 does not explicitly define x in  L.
This result for  Lukasiewicz logic was given in [16], addressing the topic in a comprehensive
way over a large landscape of logics. See [20] for the more specific area of logics extending
Ha´jek’s Basic Fuzzy Logic BL.
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3.4 Defining the irrationals
Lemma 3.11. An irrational number a ∈ [0, 1] is not definable by an MV-term in [0, 1] L.
Proof. If an MV-term ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is satisfiable in [0, 1] L, there is a rational n-tuple 〈r1, . . . , rn〉
that satisfies ϕ. Let a be an irrational. If ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is satisfiable in [0, 1] L and 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
then there is an evaluation v in [0, 1] L s.t. v(ϕ) = 1 and v(xi) 6= a.
Nevertheless, if one compromises on the requirement that implicit definitions are finite
objects (i.e., given by a term) and if one shifts from finitary to infinitary  Lukasiewicz logic
 L∞, one can implicitly define each irrational, as we now show.
Our simple construction illustrates the technique, working with only two values. We leave
any further elaboration to the reader. We do not discuss or advocate here the necessity of
introducing all irrational values as constants.
We shall extend the theory TQ. Consider irrationals a, b ∈ [0, 1] s.t. a · a = b. Irrationals
are cuts on the rationals, and the latter have already been defined by the axioms of TQ.
Let
A1 = {q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] | q < a}
A2 = {q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] | a < q}
and analogously B1, B2 for b. Introduce fresh variables (i.e., not occurring in TQ) ia, ib. Let
TQ,a = TQ ∪ {qm/n → ia | m/n ∈ A1} ∪ {ia → qm/n | m/n ∈ A2}
Analogously, define TQ,b for b.
Lemma 3.12. In any standard model of TQ,a, the variable ia has the value a.
Proof. Since TQ only admits canonical interpretations of the q-variables in the standard MV-
algebra, the cut (A1, A2), captured by the axioms of TQ,a, determines the valuation of ia.
Let TQ,a,b be the theory whose axioms are the union of axioms for TQ,a and TQ,b.
Corollary 3.13. TQ,a,b ⊢ L∞ ia · ia ≡ ib.
Proof. Since the values of ia and ib are fixed in [0, 1] L by TQ,a and TQ,b, we have
TQ,a,b |=[0,1] L ia · ia ≡ ib. Then
TQ,a,b ⊢ L∞ ia · ia ≡ ib by strong standard completeness of  L∞.
As in the case of constants for rationals, one can introduce irrational constants incre-
mentally (as above). It is known that, if a is an irrational in [0, 1] L, then the subalgebra
generated by a is dense ([9]); as in the case of rationals, when just one value is defined by
suitable axioms, other values become term definable within such a theory with an expanded
language.
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3.5 Completeness theorems
Finally, let us remark on completeness theorems in this new setting. There is nothing to add
for general or standard finite strong completeness. However, one might wonder how to spell
Pavelka completeness result. Let T be a set of formulas and ϕ a formula of  L (possibly with
some q-variables). We define
||ϕ||T∪TQ = inf{v(ϕ) | v model of T ∪ TQ}
and5
|ϕ|T∪TQ = sup{m/n | T ∪ TQ ⊢ L qm/n → ϕ}
The definition rests on a very convenient indexing of the q-variables. The same convention
occurs in the usual spelling of the provability degree in RPL: in particular, one can perform
computations and take suprema on the names of the constants. Both definition rest on the
link between the name of the constant and its intended value; usually the language is chosen
in such a way that this link is immediate.
4 Recognition and complexity
To provide a sample application of the interpretation result, let us look at the complexity of
provability from a finite theory in propositional RPL; in view of the finite strong standard
(canonical) completeness theorem for RPL, this is just the finite consequence relation in [0, 1] L
(for the propositional language with rational constants). Recall the problem: given a finite
theory T and a formula ϕ of RPL, does T ⊢RPL ϕ? For an empty T , this problem is just
theoremhood in RPL. Without wishing to discuss implementation details, we remark that
each rational constant is represented as a pair of natural numbers given in binary.
A dual form of the conservativity result gives that provability without constants is a lan-
guage fragment of provability with constants; for finite theories, the former is coNP-complete,
so the latter is coNP-hard. In [13], Ha´jek argues coNP-containment for (theoremhood and)
provability from finite theories in RPL by looking at the standard semantics and asking the
reader to verify that the decision method used in [12] for  Lukasiewicz logic, which is obtained
as a polynomial-time reduction to mixed integer programming, works even under the presence
of rational constants in the formulas. Of course, the extension with rational constants is quite
natural for the mixed integer programming problem.
It is also unnecessary. The statement of Corollary 3.7 provides a method to argue the
result without re-examining the reduction to mixed integer programming: one simply uses
the ⋆-translation and appeals to a finite subtheory of TQ to provide a canonical interpretation
for the new variables; in particular, for each constant m/n, it is necessary to include the
defining axiom for q1/n and qm/n in the finite subtheory. Next to that, the only complexity
result needed is that of coNP-completeness of finite consequence relation in  L.
A small glitch is that the interpretation provided by ⋆ and (the finite subtheory of) TQ
cannot be used in the form given above because they do not yield a polynomial translation:
for a given n, the innocent-looking abbreviation ϕn−1 in fact stands for a term of exponential
size in |n| (for n represented in binary). This problem can be rectified in the usual manner,
using new variables for intermediate powers; in the lemma below, powers of MV-terms and
5Cf. also [14], Theorem 3.1 and above.
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the product of MV-terms denoted by Π pertain to the multiplication symbol · of the language
of MV-algebras.
Lemma 4.1. For n ∈ N , n ≥ 2, take the binary representation of n − 1, i.e., let n − 1 =
Σmi=0pi2
i with pi ∈ {0, 1} and pm = 1. Let I = {i | pi = 1}. In [0, 1] L, the system of equations
y0 = ¬x
y1 = y
2
0
y2 = y
2
1
...
ym = y
2
m−1
x = Πi∈Iyi
has a unique solution, assigning the value 1/n to x.
Proof. The system implies x = (¬x)n−1. This equation has a unique solution x = 1/n in
[0, 1] L ([15], Lemma 6.3). On the other hand, the assignment x = 1/n determines the values
assigned to all the y-variables.
In what follows, the y-variables from the above lemma are referred to as “auxiliary vari-
ables”.
Lemma 4.2. 1. For n,m, I as above, the system of formulas
{y0 ≡ ¬q1/n,
m∧
i=1
(yi = y
2
i−1), q1/n = Πi∈Iyi}
defines 1/n in the variable q1/n in [0, 1] L.
2. The size of the system is polynomial in the size of n.
3. Using an analogous argument, one can polynomially define m/n.
Theorem 4.3. Provability from finite theories in RPL is polynomially reducible to provability
from finite theories in  L.
Proof. Let a finite consecution (T, ϕ) in the language of RPL be given. Let {m1/n1, . . . mk/nk}
be all the rational constants in T, q, and let all variables therein be among {x1, . . . , xl}. For
i = 1, . . . , k let Ti be the set of formulas from Lemma 4.2 (1) and (3), using a fresh pool of
auxiliary variables to define each of 1/ni and mi/ni. Let T
fin
Q =
⋃k
i=1 Ti, and let T
⋆ and ϕ⋆
result from T and ϕ by replacing its constants with the respective q-variables. Then T ⊢RPL ϕ
if and only if T ⋆ ∪T finQ ⊢ L ϕ
⋆ as in Theorem 3.7; moreover, the size of T finQ (and also T
⋆ and
ϕ⋆) is polynomial in |T |+ |ϕ|.
Corollary 4.4. Provability from finite theories in RPL is in coNP.
The construction of the polynomial translation is not less laborious than the inclusion of
the rational constants in the mixed integer programming problem; one cannot argue that the
(coNP-containment) result became simpler by omitting the constants.
However, what the construction shows is that problems such as the computational com-
plexity of RPL are in fact problems about L (using the translation). In other words, there
was no question one could ask about complexity of RPL in the first place, other than those
already settled by complexity results for  L.
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Corollary 3.5 provides a way of defining each of the rationals in  Lukasiewicz logic in the
sense of Definition 3.2. This is just one among many variants of the implicit definability result.
One can observe that the construction rests on a parametrized formula where by varying the
parameter one easily gets the definition of the intended constant for each m/n.
On the other hand, consider a randomly chosen formula. What, if anything, does it define?
We formulate this question as a decision problem, and show that it is hard.
Problem 4.5. Given an MV-term of n variables ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), an integer 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and a
rational number a, determine whether ϕ defines a in xi (in [0, 1] L).
The decision problem on the domain of triples 〈ϕ, i, a〉 as above, consisting of exactly
those where ϕ defines a in xi in the standard MV-algebra, is referred to as the DEF problem.
We seek to estimate the complexity of the problem. The estimate will in part be an
artefact of our definition. Namely, we have stipulated that each of our defining formulas be
satisfiable (in [0, 1] L); otherwise, if only the second item in Definition 3.2 were used, each
unsatisfiable formula would implicitly define every rational (and irrational) in a trivial way.
The following lemma reflects our choice.
Lemma 4.6. DEF is NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce SAT to DEF (both notions relate to [0, 1] L).
The reduction function f assigns, to a given formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), the triple
〈ϕ · (xn+1 ≡ ¬xn+1), n+ 1, 1/2〉
We show that ϕ ∈ SAT if and only if f(ϕ) ∈ DEF.
Let ϕ be satisfiable; then so is ϕ · (xn+1 ≡ ¬xn+1), and moreover, if the latter is satisfied
by a v, then v(xn+1) = 1/2, because 1/2 is the only solution to the equation x = ¬x (note
xn+1 does not occur in ϕ).
On the other hand, if ϕ is unsatisfiable, then so is ϕ · (xn+1 ≡ ¬xn+1).
Theorem 4.7. DEF is coNP-hard.
Proof. For a given 〈ϕ, i, a〉 as above, let us consider the condition
∃v[0,1] L(v(ϕ) = 1& v(xi) 6= a) (D)
This condition negates the second condition in Definition 3.2. It is in NP (because of
small witnesses); to show it is NP-hard, it is enough to consider a variant of the reduction
from Lemma 4.6: to find out whether ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ SAT, ask the algorithm for D about
〈ϕ · (xn+1 ≡ ¬xn+1), n + 1, 1/4〉. If ϕ is satisfiable, then D is satisfied on f(ϕ); if not, then
neither is ϕ · (xn+1 ≡ ¬xn+1), so D fails. So D is NP-complete.
Now we reduce D¯ (the complement of D), i.e., the set 〈ϕ, i, a〉 s.t. v(ϕ) = 1 implies
v(xi) = a, to DEF (i.e., to D¯ with the additional condition of satisfiability for ϕ).
Let 〈ϕ(x˜), i, a〉 be an instance. Let ψ(xi, z˜) be a formula defining a in xi (as earlier in this
paper). Note that
(i) ψ is satisfiable, and for any satisfying evaluation v, we have v(xi) = a;
(ii) ψ can be chosen so that its size is polynomial in the size of the given instance.
Let f(〈ϕ, i, a〉) = 〈(ϕ ∨ ψ)(x˜, z˜), i, a〉. We claim that 〈ϕ, i, a〉 satisfies (D) if and only if
f(〈ϕ, i, a〉) ∈ DEF.
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If 〈ϕ, i, a〉 satisfies D¯, then ϕ ∨ ψ is satisfiable (because ψ is), and satisfies the condition
of D¯, because both ϕ and ψ satisfy it. So f(〈ϕ, i, a〉) ∈ DEF.
If 〈ϕ, i, a〉 satisfies (D), then there is a v s.t. v(ϕ) = 1 and v(xi) 6= a. This is also true
about ϕ ∨ ψ.
(The proof of) Theorem 4.7 answers the complexity question for a modification of Defini-
tion 3.2 omitting the satisfiability requirement. Such a problem is coNP-complete.
5 More on RPL and  L
As stated already,  L is a syntactic fragment of RPL: well-formed formulas of  L are exactly
those well formed formulas of RPL that do not contain any constants other than 0 and 1.
Dually, RPL is a conservative extension of  L.
The conservative extension statement, however, does not quite capture the tight relation
between RPL and  L.6 To appreciate that, consider for example that Peano arithmetic is a
conservative extension of Presburger arithmetic. But Peano arithmetic does not stand to
Presburger arithmetic as RPL stands to  L.
Rather, what we have in RPL is an axiomatic expansion of the language as exemplified by
extending the theory of groups, presented with the binary group operation only, with a new
constant for the neutral element. This is an extension by definition (so it is conservative) and
because we can prove existence and unicity of the solution to x ◦ x = x, the new constant for
the neutral element can be eliminated. In the case of RPL, [14, Theorem 2.6] gives the exact
sense in which constants can be eliminated, as mentioned in Section 1 above.
Not so much the conservativity result, but predominantly the faithful interpretation result
suggests that the logics stand too close to each other to be even considered as two genuine
systems, except for some very theoretical considerations (such as the set of term-definable
functions in the standard semantics, for example); for practical applications, however, it is a
matter of convenience which of the two logics is used.
6 On precision and vagueness
Within the framework of  Lukasiewicz logic, with or without constants in the language, one
can be surgically precise about truth values ascribed to particular propositions. We have seen
that, under a simple theory such as TQ, one can pinpoint the truth value of a proposition p
to any rational number by positing p ≡ qm/n. There is no talk about valuations here: TQ
and p ≡ qm/n MV-terms or sets thereof.
7 Given that the rationals are dense within [0, 1], this
level of precision seems sufficient for practical purposes, which presuppose finiteness. Should
irrational values be needed, however (thus forfeiting finiteness), we have shown how to obtain
them switching the underlying logic to the infinitary logic  L∞.
In recent papers concerning the modelling of vague predicates with fuzzy logic, the predi-
cate tall is considered as an example amenable to modelling by the apparatus of formal fuzzy
6This is also reflected in [14, §3]:“Lemma 2.3 shows that RPL∀ is a very conservative extension indeed of
 L∀. There is a sense in which even its new formulae don’t express anything which can’t be expressed by old
formulae.”
7Admittedly, TQ imposes its own semantics: it does not have a model over algebras that do not contain a
copy of the rationals.
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logic. It is so amenable because it is a vague way of referring to an easily measurable quantity,
namely height, which is not vague, but is measured on a linear scale.
The claim here is not that  Lukasiewicz logic or its unspecified theories prove p to have the
truth value m/n or any other value for that matter (unless p turns out to be a theorem or a
contradiction of  Lukasiewicz logic, of course). Specific theories may indeed prove p ≡ qm/n,
but then (trivially) the axioms of such theories need to be at least as strong as p ≡ qm/n.
 Lukasiewicz logic however, as a formal system, does not commit to such ad hoc stipulations,
but merely makes it possible to express them, and to enable deduction on them.
One possible rephrasing of the above is that, right side of the turnstile, we know rather
little of how our “truth constants” came to be; bar some notational conventions (helping us to
distinguish between constants and variables), we are presented with a set of syntactic objects
that obey some bookkeeping statements.
Detailed accounts [18] and [1], echoing also earlier works of Ha´jek, explain that ( Lukasiewicz
or other) fuzzy logic does not insist on assigning specific real values to propositions, but rather,
broadly speaking, studies consequence on, and reasoning with, propositions that in princi-
ple admit these truth values. These accounts are offered in response to some attempts at
refutation of fuzzy logic on the ground of the artificial precision problem that points out the
lack of incentives for preferring one intermediate truth value over another one for particular
propositions.
We have argued that precision can be neatly captured by the syntax of  Lukasiewicz logic.
All of that is happening left of the turnstile. We have also reminded ourselves of the simple
fact that it is nontrivial to recognize what precisely an arbitrary theory implicitly defines.
One might, therefore, understand the account presented here as a supportive argument for
the thesis that precision happens in fuzzy logic, and if it happens, it must happen within the
assumptions before it can happen within the conclusions, which seems to be one of the main
points of the above papers.
7 Conclusion
Thanks to finite strong standard completeness of  Lukasiewicz logic, our semantic rendering
of implicit definability blends naturally with the more commonly given implicit definability
notions that refer to variables (as when introducing Beth property, see [16, 20]) or connectives
(as in [2, 3]), i.e., syntactic objects.
The findings of Section 3 and 4 seem to confirm the ambivalent status of constants
in  Lukasiewicz logic: they are useful but dispensable abbreviations, with statements of
 Lukasiewicz logic with constants being expressible in  Lukasiewicz logic without any constants
but those that are inherent to it. It may well be that keeping the constants is “more elegant”,
as asserted by Ha´jek in [12], or that “. . . even for partial truth, Rational Pavelka logic deals
with exactly the same logic as  Lukasiewicz logic—but in a very much more convenient way”,
as [14] remarks. We do not attempt to argue for or against these views. What is argued
here, however, is that metamathematical statements about Rational Pavelka logic naturally
translate to statements about (certain theories over)  Lukasiewicz logic without any added
constants. In particular, it is not the case that  Lukasiewicz logic with truth constants is
richer, more expressive, or more general than  Lukasiewicz logic without constants.
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